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CONSERVATION FORCE ET AL. v. DELTA AIR
LINES: THE LEGALITY OF AN AIRLINE BAN ON
BIG GAME HUNTING TROPHIES
Daniel Spivey*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Big game hunting is a sport that has been around for hundreds of
years. In today’s day and age, hunters are willing to pay exorbitant
amounts of money in order to obtain hunting permits to legally hunt
in Africa. For the most part, this is a practice that has existed
peacefully for many of years. However, the practice was brought to
light in July 2015 when a hunter, from Minnesota, shot and killed
one of Zimbabwe's most celebrated lions.1 In response, the sport was
made very well known and the public was outraged, not only with
the hunter, but also, with the sport in general.2 Soon enough, pressure
was applied on large corporations to try and curtail the practice in
any way that they could.3 The public began to look to airlines for a
response because the airlines were the ones who were transporting
the trophies back to the U.S. As a result, all three of the U.S. legacy
carriers – American, Delta, and United – decided to ban the transport
of big game hunting trophies aboard their airplanes.4
Ever since the airlines were deregulated with the Aviation
Deregulation Act of 1978, it has become much harder to challenge an
airline on one of its services or lack thereof.5 However, a group of
Plaintiffs are attempting to challenge the Delta Airlines ban on big
game hunting trophies in the Northern District of Texas. This is an
issue of first impression for the court because there are no cases that
challenge the legality of an airline's embargo on a specific piece of
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2017; B.S. Professional Flight Technology,
Purdue University, 2013. Daniel Spivey was born and raised in Los Angeles, California. He currently
serves as a Research Staff Writer for DePaul Journal of Sports Law & Contemporary Problems and is
currently focusing on aviation law. He has received all of his pilots licenses.
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Reynard Loki, The Bigger Story Behind the Killing of Cecil the Lion That the Media Overlooked,
ALTERNET (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.alternet.org/environment/bigger-story-behind-killing-cecillion-media-overlooked.
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4
Id.
5
See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
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cargo in the modern era. This Article will discuss the various hurdles
that the Plaintiffs will have to overcome in order to convince the
Court that Delta acted unlawfully.6
II. BACKGROUND
Cecil the Lion was a male Southwest African lion that lived
primarily in the Hwange National Park in Matabeleland North,
Zimbabwe.7 The lion was a major attraction at the park and was
being tracked by the University of Oxford as part of a larger study.8
On July 2, 2015, Cecil the Lion was hunted and killed by Dr. Walter
Palmer.9 In the days after news broke of the killing, there was large
public outcry over the sport-hunting industry as a whole.10 One of the
industries that felt pressure from the public was the aviation industry
because the airlines would commonly transport the hunting trophies
back to the United States.
In response to this public pressure, on August 4, 2015, all three
major U.S. airline carriers decided to ban the transport of lions,
leopards, elephants, rhinoceros’ and buffalo killed by trophy
hunters.11 Delta Airlines’ ban was the most significant because it is
the only American airline to fly directly between the United States
and South Africa.12 Shortly after the Cecil the Lion incident, but
prior to any U.S. airline ban, South African Airways had placed its
own embargo; however, this ban was lifted two weeks later after
agreeing to tighter inspections.13 In the international community,
airlines such as British Airways, KLM, Singapore Airways,
Lufthansa, Air Emirates, Iberia Airlines, IAG Cargo, and Qantas had
already implemented bans by the time that Delta decided to institute
its ban.14
6

This Article does not address standing or damages.
Marc Dorian et. al., What Happened in the Harrowing Hours Before Cecil the Lion Was Killed, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 13, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/International/happened-harrowing-hours-cecil-lionkilled/story?id=33044279.
8
Id.
9
Id.
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Loki, supra note 1.
11
Major U.S. Airlines end trophy hunter shipments after Cecil outcry, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-wildlife-airlines-idUSKCN0Q90KT20150804.
12
Id.
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Id.
14
Samantha Mathewson, Airlines Ban Hunting “Trophies” Onboard, NATURE WORLD NEWS
(Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.natureworldnews.com/articles/16201/20150821/airlines-ban-huntingtrophies-onboard.htm.
7
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There is little question that Delta Airlines is a “common carrier.”
A common carrier is one that holds itself out to the public as being
willing to transport persons or property for compensation, to the
extent that its facilities permit.15 Commercial airline companies
flying passengers for hire on regular schedules over definite routes
have ordinarily been deemed common carriers.16 The controlling
factor when determining whether a carrier is a “common carrier” is
whether the carrier holds out its profession to the public generally, by
words or by course of conduct, as to the services offered or
performed for compensation, and undertakes to carry for all people
indifferently.17
As a common carrier, there are two ways in which Delta Airlines
is regulated: through federal statute, such as the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 (“ADA”) or the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (“FAA”),
and via federal common law. In order for a plaintiff to bring a claim
against a common carrier, they must have a right under federal
statute or federal common law. The Supreme Court has made it clear
that federal common law causes of action continue to exist when a
federal rule of decision is “necessary to protect uniquely federal
interests.”18 The court in Sam L. Majors Jewelers vv. ABX,
Incorporated, found that when deregulating the airlines under the
ADA, Congress chose not only to repeal federal common law in
“clear” and “explicit” language but that it chose the opposite
course.19 The ADA includes an express provision that preserves
common law remedies.20 In enacting the ADA, Congress included a
savings clause that provided “[n]othing in this chapter shall in any
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by
statute, but the provisions of this Chapter are in addition to such
remedies.”21 Thus, the court validated the idea that federal common
law can apply to common air carriers. The ADA's preemption
provision states that:
[e]xcept as provided in this subsection, a State, political
subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2

Woolsey v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 993 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1993).
73 A.L.R.2d 346, 2 (1978).
17
Id. at 3a.
18
Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 926–27 (5th Cir. Tex. 1997) (quoting Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)).
19
Id. at 928.
20
Id. at 928.
21
Id.
15
16
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States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision having the force and effect of law related
to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may
provide air transportation under this subpart.22
The Supreme Court concluded that the phrase “other provision
having the force and effect of law” includes common-law claims.23
The ADA's preemption clause, §1305(a)(1), read together with the
FAA's saving clause, halts states from imposing their own
substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or services, but
not from affording relief to a party who claims and proves that an
airline dishonored a term the airline itself stipulated.24 The Supreme
Court noted: “[t]his distinction between what the state dictates and
what an airline itself undertakes confines courts in breach-of-contract
actions to the parties’ bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement
based on state laws or policies external to the agreement.”25 This
means that when an airline has voluntarily chosen to agree to certain
terms or conditions, the court must look strictly at the agreement and
not outside of it. Additionally, in another case, the Supreme Court
held that the key phrase “related to” expresses a “broad pre-emptive
purpose.”26
A private plaintiff has the right to bring suit under a federal statute
only if Congress created that right.27 The FAA does not contain an
express private right of action to enforce §41310(a). In Cort v. Ash,
the Supreme Court created a four factor test to determine whether a
statute creates a private cause of action:
1. whether the statute creates a federal right in favor of the
plaintiff;
2. whether there is any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create or deny a remedy;
3. whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of
the legislative scheme to imply a remedy;
4. whether the cause of action is one that is traditionally
22
23
24
25
26
27

49 U.S.C.S. § 41713(b)(1) (1997).
Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1430 (2014).
Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232–33 (1995).
Id. at 233.
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992).
Alexander v Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
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relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law.28
As discussed later in this Article, the Supreme Court's decision
in Alexander v. Sandoval would make it more difficult for
federal courts to recognize an implied right of action.
A. Conservation Force v. Delta
The case that this article focuses on is Conservation Force et al. v.
Delta Airlines, Inc.29 This case was brought in the Northern District
of Texas by a group of Plaintiffs claiming various injuries as a result
of Delta Airlines’ ban on hunting trophies.
1. The Parties
The first Plaintiff, Conservation Force, is a non-profit 501(c)(3)
public foundation formed for purposes of conserving wildlife and
wild places.30 Conservation Force's member-supporters are hunterconservationists (both individuals and organizations) who engage in
user-pay, regulated, sustainable hunting, and then import trophies
back to the U.S.31 Conservation Force works closely and represents
the safari hunting operators who provide anti-poaching support, and
local communities who live with wildlife and benefit from its
sustainable use.32 It serves the public through support and
development of conservation infrastructure locally, nationally, and
internationally.33 The Plaintiffs, Dallas Safari Club (“DSC”),
Houston Safari Club (“HSC”), and Corey Knowlton, are all member
supporters of Conservation Force.34
The second Plaintiff, DSC, is a non-profit conservation, education,
and hunter advocacy organization based in Dallas, Texas.35 It is a
membership organization that represents thousands of individual
28

Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
Conservation Force’s Compl., Conservation Force et al. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No 15-cv-3348
(filed N.D. Tex. October 15, 2015) [hereinafter Conservation Force Compl.].
30
Id. at ¶ 13.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
See Corporate Description, CONSERVATION FORCE,
http://www.conservationforce.org/#!home/mainPage (last visited Apr. 30, 2016).
34
Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶ 13.
35
Id. at ¶ 14.
29
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hunters and service businesses including hunting operators, who
support the user-pay, sustainable use-based programs.36 About sixty
percent of its members live outside of Texas.37 The group also
spends one million dollars, annually, on lobbying efforts and wildlife
projects, such as genetic studies of lions.38 Its mission is to conserve
wildlife and wilderness and to promote the interests of hunters
worldwide.39
The third Plaintiff, HSC, is a 501(c)(4) non-profit, volunteer
organization whose mission is to preserve the sport of hunting
through education, conservation and protection of hunters’ rights.40
HSC’s members are largely African safari hunters and related service
providers, including hunting operators.41 Since 1972, HSC has
provided millions of dollars for conservation, education, and sporting
rights initiatives worldwide to ensure the longevity of the sport and
the sustainability of sporting resources.42
The fourth Plaintiff, Corey Knowlton, is a hunter-conservationist
domiciled in Texas, a life member of DSC, and a supporting member
of Conservation Force.43 In May 2015, he hunted a black rhino in
Nambia.44 To participate in the hunt, he paid $350,000 to Nambia’s
Game Products Trust Fund, which is funded exclusively for black
rhino protection and recovery.45 Delta refused to ship Mr.
Knowlton's trophy back from Southern Africa.46
The Defendant, Delta Air Lines, Inc., is a Delaware corporation
that does business in the Northern District of Texas.47 It is an
international airline that is headquartered and domiciled in Atlanta.48
Delta flies directly to South Africa and, through its alliance partners,
36

Id.
See Corporate Description, CONSERVATION FORCE,
http://www.conservationforce.org/#!home/mainPage (last visited Apr. 30, 2016).
38
Jeff Mosier, Dallas Safari Club Developing Into A National Powerhouse, DALLAS NEWS (Jan. 7,
2016), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/metro/20160106-dallas-safari-club-developing-into-nationalpowerhouse.ece.
39
Our Mission, DALLAS SAFARI CLUB, https://www.biggame.org/who-we-are/our-mission/ (last visited
Apr. 30, 2016).
40
See generally Houston Safari Club, http://www.houstonsafariclub.org/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2016).
41
See Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶ 15.
42
See generally HOUSTON SAFARI CLUB, http://www.houstonsafariclub.org/ (last visited Apr. 30,
2016); Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶ 15.
43
Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶ 16.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at ¶ 19.
48
Id.
37
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to Tanzania and Zimbabwe.49
2. The Allegations
In count one of the Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that Delta had
violated its duties as a common carrier under federal common law
for discriminating against cargo.50 The Plaintiffs claimed that the
principle of a common carrier is made clear in case law, the
definitions of “interstate air transportation” and foreign air
transportation,51 and the prohibitions on discriminatory practices.52
In count two of the Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that before
Delta imposed its embargo, there was a reasonable probability that
the Plaintiffs and the members they represented would have entered
into business relations with third parties.53 The hunterconservationists represented here, such as Mr. Knowlton, would have
entered into business relationships for hunting safaris; professional
hunters and communities would have offered and sold those safaris
and conducted them; wildlife ministries would have granted licenses
and other hunting permits; and the communities would have
benefitted as a result.54 The Plaintiffs alleged that Delta's embargo is
independently tortious and unlawful.55
In count three of the Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that Delta
has failed to comply with federal regulations requiring that it update
the FAA about information regarding carriage exclusions, such as the
Big Five trophy embargo.56 Count three further alleged that Delta has
violated the conditions of its air carrier certificate by defying national
and international law, and that it should cease to operate flights.57
Every flight that Delta currently operates is in violation of 49 U.S.C.
§ 44711, which prohibits a person from operating as an air carrier in
violation of a term of its air carrier certificate.58

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶19.
Id. at ¶¶ 62–63.
See 49 U.S.C. § 40102 (2012).
See 49 U.S.C. § 41310 (2000); see also Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶¶ 62–63.
See Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶¶ 68–69.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 70.
Id. at ¶¶ 73–74.
Id.
Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Whether Delta Violated Its Duties As A Common Carrier
Today, common carriers, especially air carriers, are mostly
governed by a statutory scheme. The Aviation Deregulation Act of
1978 substantially deregulated the industry and statutorily prescribed
certain aspects of the industry that were not to be regulated.59 In
order for Delta to violate its duty as a common carrier, it must have
violated either federal common law or a statute prohibiting
discrimination against cargo.60 Further, in order for this duty to be
challenged, the Plaintiffs must have had a recognized cause of action
either through statute or common law.61 Therefore, there must have
been a common law remedy under the ADA for a cause of action to
arise.62 The first part of this section will examine federal commonlaw as it pertains to air carriers and the second part of this section
will examine the relevant statutes.
1. Common Carrier Duties Under Federal Common Law
This section will discuss the duties that are imposed on airlines,
under federal common-law, as they relate to shipping cargo.
Commercial airlines flying passengers for hire on regular schedules
over definite routes ordinarily have been deemed to be common
carriers.63 Common carriers are bound to receive all goods offered by
the owners or their agents for transportation and to carry them for a
just compensation to the agreed destination or place of delivery on
the carrier's line or route.64 This duty only applies when the goods
are such as the airline undertakes to carry for the public, or of a kind
coming within the class which they usually carry in the course of
their employment.65
A common carrier of goods is not obliged to receive and

59

See Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1997) (The court found that
the plaintiff's action did not arise under a federal statute so it looked to federal common law.).
60
See id.
61
See id.
62
See id. at 928.
63
8A Am. Jur. 2d Aviation § 59 (2015).
64
46 Am. Jur. 2d Carriers § 277 (2015).
65
Id.
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transport all kinds of goods that may be offered for carriage. 66 Its
obligation to carry is coextensive with and limited by its public
profession as to the kinds of goods it is carrying.67 Accordingly, a
common carrier of goods may refuse to receive and transport goods
that are not of the kind it undertakes or is accustomed to carry for the
public.68 The obligation to transport property of which the carrier
usually carries, if offered with reasonable compensation, comes from
the circumstance that a common carrier is a public servant offering a
service, not just for revenue, but also for the convenience and
accommodation of the community.69 A carrier may adopt reasonable
rules and regulations by giving notice to shippers, who must then
comply with the rules and regulations, before they can hold the
carrier responsible for a refusal to transport.70 A carrier may
determine whatever terms and conditions it chooses upon the
transportation of property of which it is under no legal obligation to
carry.71 The basic responsibility of a common carrier is to “make no
distinction in providing transportation for those who apply for it.”72
It may not accommodate one person and arbitrarily refuse another
person.73 In York Co. v. Central Railroad, the Supreme Court
elaborated on the duties of a common carrier:
The law prescribes the duties and responsibilities of the
common carrier. He exercises, in one sense, a public
employment, and has duties to the public to perform.
Though he may limit his services to the carriage of
particular kinds of goods, and may prescribe regulations
to protect himself against imposition and fraud, and fix a
rate of charges proportionate to the magnitude of the
risks he may have to encounter, he can make no
discrimination between persons, or vary his charges
from their condition or character. He is bound to accept
all goods offered within the course of his employment,
and is liable to an action in case of refusal. 74
66

Id. § 289.
Id.
68
Id. § 277.
69
Id.
70
Id. § 280.
71
Id.
72
13 Am. Jur. 2d § 227 (citations omitted).
73
Id.
74
York Co. v. Cent. R.R., 70 U.S. 107, 112 (U.S. 1866) (Plaintiff filed suit for damages relating to the
destruction of his cotton shipment, which was destroyed while in the care of the common carrier
67
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The Supreme Court has also held that “a party engaging in the
business of a common carrier is bound to treat all shippers alike and
can be compelled to do so.”75 In American Trucking Ass'ns,
Incorporated Inc. v. Atchinson, the Supreme Court upheld an
Interstate Commerce Commission's (“ICC”) rule that forced railroads
to carry trailers for their competitor motor carriers at the going rate.76
There, the Court recognized that “[f]rom the earliest days, common
carriers have had a duty to carry all goods offered for transportation”
and that “[r]efusal to carry the goods of some shippers was
unlawful.”77 The Court went on to note that the railroads may not
offer services for transporting trailers or for other shippers and then
deny that service to motor carriers.78 Further, the Court noted that the
“duty of equal treatment as a common carrier is comprehensive;
there are no implied exceptions.”79 The fact that a person may be a
competitor does not allow a common carrier to discriminate.80
a. Arguments Advanced by the Parties
In its response to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, Delta cited to case law
showing that federal common law permits a common carrier by air to
adopt a cargo policy under which the carrier can refuse to accept
certain types goods.81 The Seventh Circuit held that if a shipper
wanted to ship a package with an actual value of more than $50,000,
then UPS was entitled to refuse acceptance of that package as a
business decision.82 The court further held that a common carrier is
not “obliged to accept every package” and noted that, according to
UPS's tariff, the company also rejects “poorly wrapped packages,
human body parts, animals, currency, and negotiable instruments.”83
Delta also cited B.J. Alan Co. v. ICC, where a group of shippers
challenged a UPS tariff that prohibited the transport of common

defendant.).
75
Mo. P. R. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612, 620 (U.S. 1909) (dispute arose over a
common carrier rail company refusing to transfer rail cars to plaintiff).
76
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Atchinson, 387 U.S. 397, 400–01, 413 (1967).
77
Id. at 406.
78
Id. at 407.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Delta’s Mot. to Dismiss at 7, Conservation Force et al. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No 3:15-CV-03348M, 7 (filed N.D. Tex. December 21, 2015) [hereinafter Delta’s Mot. to Dismiss]
82
Treiber & Straub, Inc. v. U.P.S., Inc., 474 F.3d 379, 386 (7th Cir. 2007).
83
Id.
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fireworks.84 The court stated that the “key showing for a carrier,
when it deletes a class of goods from the scope of its operations is
inordinate operational burdens on the carrier's side, with hardship to
the shippers an offsetting consideration.”85 The court held that UPS
could prohibit the transport of fireworks because the transportation
of fireworks notably hampered UPS’ efficient operation.86
In response to Delta's Motion for Summary Judgment, the
Plaintiffs cited to a Supreme Court case, where a plaintiff challenged
a common carrier for discrimination on the basis of goods being
shipped.87 The Court held that “a common carrier not only is obliged
to receive and carry such goods as he is able to carry and customarily
does carry, but he is required to carry for all patrons alike; in
applying an equal right to have their goods transported in the order of
their application.”88 The Court stated that the essential principle of
the requirement of common carriers is that they carry the goods of all
persons, with no unjust preference, unless they physically cannot
carry the goods.89 The Court also went on to note that the steamship
company could stop carrying a particular commodity or become a
special carrier, not a common carrier, but as long as it was a common
carrier, it must follow common carrier rules.90
Both Delta and the Plaintiffs cite to Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., in which Missouri Pacific engaged in the
business of transferring cars for all companies except the mill
company.91 In that case, the Supreme Court held that “[w]henever
one engages in that business the obligation of equal service to all
arises, and that obligation, irrespective of legislative action or special
mandate, can be enforced by the courts.”92 The Supreme Court
affirmed the notion that common carriers must treat all potential
customers the same and that the courts can enforce that right.93
It is apparent from the case law that common carriers have a duty
84

B.J. Alan Co. v. ICC, 897 F.2d 561, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (this case was a challenge to motor carriers
not air carriers).
85
Id. at 563.
86
Id. at 565.
87
Conservation Force’s Response to Delta’s Mot., Conservation Force et al. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
No 3:15-cv-3348 (filed N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Conservation Force’s Response to Delta’s
Mot.] (citing Ocean S.S. Co. v. Savannah Locomotive Works & Supply Co., 63 S.E. 577, 578 (Ga.
1909)).
88
Id. at 579.
89
Id. at 580.
90
Id.
91
211 U.S. 612, 619 (1909).
92
Id. at 619–20.
93
Id.
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to treat all shippers equally and to not discriminate against any would
be shippers. This federal common law doctrine was well established
before the ADA was enacted; thus, according to the ADA's savings
clause, if the Plaintiffs can prove that there was a breach of this duty,
then they will have a cause of action that is not pre-empted. The
main determination for the court will be to decide whether this is a
type of discrimination meant to be protected by federal common law.
A full discussion on this question will be addressed later in this
Article.
2. Relevant Statutory Provision
As mentioned earlier, much of the obligations imposed on air
carriers are done via federal statutes. The relevant statute, as it
pertains to this lawsuit, is 49 U.S.C. § 41310(a). This statute states
that “an air carrier or foreign air carrier may not subject a person,
place, port, or type of traffic in foreign air transportation to
unreasonable discrimination.”94 Accordingly, a plaintiff has the right
to bring suit under a federal statute only if Congress created that
right.95 Congress can create a private right of action either expressly
or by implication.96 The FAA does not contain an express private
right of action to enforce §41310(a), thus this section will examine
whether there is an implied cause of action.
a. Previous Statute
In order to fully understand §41310(a), it is important to see how
§404(b), the provision that §41310(a) was adapted from, of the FAA
was handled.97 The federal courts are in agreement that while the
FAA does not provide a private remedy for violation by an air carrier
of the discrimination provisions, a private civil action may, in an
appropriate case, be implied.98 Where the injury caused by the
carrier's conduct appears to fall within the scope of the FAA’s
purpose to provide adequate air transportation without unreasonable
preferences or unjust discrimination, the courts hold the case

94

49 U.S.C. § 41310(a).
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
96
Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1997).
97
§ 404(b) was codified as 49 U.S.C §1374(b).
98
Availability of private civil action for violation of § 404(b) of Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49
U.S.C.A. § 1374(b)), 41 A.L.R. Fed. 532, 3a (prohibiting discrimination by airline).
95
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appropriate for a private remedy.99 In determining whether or not
private right of action should be implied from 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b), a
court should look to the four factors mentioned earlier from Cort v.
Ash.100
In Polansky v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., the court considered the
Cort factors to determine whether there was a private remedy in 49
U.S.C. § 1374.101 The court stated that “[a]lthough §1374(b) is silent
about private enforcement, courts have implied a private remedy for
a variety of acts by the air carrier, including racial discrimination,
and bumping in violation of the airline's own standards.”102 In the
court's view, each new category of conduct alleged to violate
§1374(b) “must be tested against the standards stated by the Supreme
Court in Cort v. Ash.”103 This court reasoned that the statute was
aimed to protect the right of air access to air facilities from
discriminatory interference by the air carrier.104 The court cited other
areas of the FAA to indicate that the purpose of the Act is: “[t]he
promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air
carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue
preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive
practices.”105 In this instance, the court found no private right under
the circumstances because the plaintiffs only suffered “inferior
accommodations” and not “discriminatory denial of access to air
facilities.”106
In Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, the Fifth Circuit held that the
airline violated the discrimination provision of the FAA by unjustly
and unreasonably discriminating against a passenger by giving undue
and unreasonable preferences to others.107 In Wills v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., a California district court found that the plaintiff was
unduly prejudiced in that unreasonable preference was given to
others, since he was one of two tourist passengers forbidden passage
in favor of first-class passengers who were accommodated by being
placed in the tourist section of the aircraft.108 The court held that by
99

Id.
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
101
Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 334 (3d Cir. 1975).
102
Id. at 335.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 336–37.
106
Id. at 338; Conservation Force’s Response to Delta’s Mot., supra note 87, at 12.
107
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disregarding plaintiff's priority, the airline unjustly and unreasonably
discriminated against him.109 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
extended protection under §1374 to include non-passengers in Mason
v. Belieu.110 The court stated that, “[n]ot only must non-passengers
be included within the class of persons covered by the Act, but the
injury for which they seek recovery must be an interest protected by
the statute.”111 However, the court went on to find that there was no
cause of action for the plaintiff because section 404 was not created
to assure persons waiting for passengers that they will be assisted
courteously at information counters.112 Courts have recognized
implied causes of actions in several other instances as well.113
b. Current Statute
Recent cases have shown a split when it comes to deciding
whether a private right of action exists under the newer §41310(a). A
District Court in New Jersey found that there was a private right of
action under §41310(a) and stated, “federal courts have consistently
held that persons discriminatorily denied access to travel have an
implied right of action under §404(b) of the FAA, the statutory
predecessor to 49 U.S.C. § 41310(a).”114 In another recent case, the
court in the Western District of Wisconsin found that although §
41310 prohibits air carriers from unreasonably discriminating, it did
not provide any cause of action for its violation.115
Delta argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v.
Sandoval116 should be used to rule out any implied right of action
under § 41310.117 In Sandoval, the Supreme Court held that private
rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by
109
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Congress.118 The Court continued to hold that without statutory
intent, no cause of action existed and courts were prohibited from
creating a cause of action, regardless of how desirable it might be as
a matter of policy or as a matter of compatibility with the statute.119
The Court stated that “legal context matters only to the extent it
clarifies text” and that “the interpretive inquiry begins with the text
and structure of the statute.”120
3. Right of Action Under the Air Carrier Access Act
Cases decided before Sandoval found that an implied private right
of action existed under the Air Carrier Access Act (“ACAA”), a
statute that also contains an anti-discrimination provision.121 The
ACAA does not provide for an express private cause of action.122 In
Shinault v. American Airlines, the court discussed the issue of an
implied cause of action under the ACAA in depth.123 The court
affirmed the proposition that courts used §404(b) (the predecessor to
§41310) of the FAA as a basis for implying private causes of action
by handicapped individuals against commercial airlines.124
Ultimately, the court in Shinault found an implied cause of action
under the ACAA.125 The Eighth circuit also recognized a private
cause of action in Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.126
However, after the Sandoval decision, both the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits ruled against an implied cause of action.127 In Lopez v.
JetBlue Airlines, the court discussed the impact that Sandoval would
have on determining an implied cause of action by stating, “after
Sandoval, if Congress has manifested no intent to provide a private
right of action, we cannot create one.”128 The court ultimately held:
I find that the ACAA is directed at protecting the rights
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of disabled passengers. However, the text does not refer
to a private right to sue. Moreover, the structure of the
statutory scheme weighs against the implication of a
private right of action, as it provides an alternative
means of vindicating the rights of disabled passengers:
an administrative enforcement scheme.129
It is important to remember that although the ACAA is a different
statute than the FAA, it can still serve as an important guidepost as to
how courts are going to decide the issue of implied causes of action
as they relate to the airlines. One would also think that if the courts
are firm on individuals with disabilities, then they would also be firm
for claims of discrimination.
4. Alternative Means to Vindicate Rights
One of the points that Lopez makes is the availability of alternative
means to vindicate rights.130 This is in line with the second Cort
factor, which examines a legislative intent to create or deny a
remedy.131 In a separate Supreme Court decision, the Court found
that where a statute contains “elaborate enforcement provisions it
cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens.”132
Accordingly, it is important to take a look at other remedies that
private individuals are provided under the FAA.
First, under §46101(a)(1), “[a] person may file a complaint in
writing with the Secretary of Transportation” for a person violating
part of Title 49, Subtitle VII, Part A, which includes §41310(a).133
The Department of Transportation (“DOT”) is responsible for
investigating the complaint if there are reasonable grounds for the
investigation.134 Additionally, the FAA or DOT may commence an
investigation if it reasonably appears that a person is violating the
Act.135 If the person is found to have violated the Act, the FAA and
the DOT may issue an order to compel compliance. Additionally, the
FAA and the DOT may impose a general civil penalty of up to

129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id. at 6–7.
Id.
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981).
49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(1) (2001).
Id.
Id. § 46101(a)(2).

124 J.OF SPORTS LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 12:1

$27,500 for statutory violations.136 This enforcement authority is
backstopped by § 46110(a), which states:
a person disclosing a substantial interest in an order
issued by the Secretary of Transportation … may apply
for review of the order by filing a petition for review in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit or in the court of appeals of the United
States for the circuit in which the person resides or its
principle place of business. The petition must be filed
not later than 60 days after the order is issued.137
Second, the Secretary of Transportation may bring a civil action
against a person to enforce § 41310(a). Further, upon request from
the Secretary of Transportation, the Attorney General may bring a
civil action to enforce the statute.138 Violations of § 41310(a) are also
punishable by criminal fines.139 The Supreme Court held in Sandoval
that “[t]he express provision of one method of enforcing a
substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude
others.”140 Since there are express provisions to enforce the statute,
Sandoval shows that Congress intended to preclude any others.
Thus, it would appear that the statutory construction of the FAA
weighs strongly in favor of the second Cort factor. It will ultimately
be up to the court to decide whether these provisions are adequate to
remedy the needs of the Plaintiffs in this particular case. However, it
is apparent that Congress carefully thought out the administrative
proceedings under the Act. There has yet to be a case deciding
whether the remedies provided are enough for a violation of § 41310.
However, the court in Love v. Delta Airlines stated that “[t]he fact
that Congress has expressly provided private litigants with one right
of action – the right to review of administrative action on the courts
of appeals – powerfully suggests that Congress did not intend to
provide other private rights of action,” when ruling on a private right
of action under the ACAA.141

136
137
138
139
140
141

Id. § 46301(a)(1)(A); see also 14 C.F.R. § 383.2 (2015).
49 U.S.C. § 46110(a).
Id. § 46107(b)(1)(A).
Id. § 46316.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001).
Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1357 (11th Cir. 2002).

2016]

BIG GAME HUNTING TROPHIES

125

a. Is There an Express Private Remedy?
The next argument that could be made is that Congress provided
for an express private remedy under another provision of the
statutory scheme.142
When Congress has established a detailed enforcement
scheme which expressly provides a private right of
action for violations of specific provisions that is a
strong indication that Congress did not intend to provide
private litigants with a means of redressing violations of
other sections of the Act.143
Section 46108 provides private plaintiffs a cause of action to
enforce the requirement in § 41101(a)(1), that an air carrier hold a
DOT-issues certificate of public convenience and necessity.144 Delta
argued that the FAA contains an express private right of action that
does not authorize suits to enforce § 41310.145 The Plaintiffs will
have a difficult time showing that Congress implied a private right of
action for one provision when it expressly created one for a different
provision under the same statutory scheme.
b. Has There Been Undue Discrimination?
The biggest hurdle that the Plaintiffs will have to face is what
constitutes “undue discrimination.” If they cannot carry that burden,
then the cause of action issues will be moot. A claim for
unreasonable discrimination will survive when it is alleged and
proven that the plaintiff's right to fair, equal, and nondiscriminatory
treatment has been violated.146 Once the plaintiff proves
discrimination or preference, the burden then shifts to the defendant
airline to prove how the discrimination was reasonable.147 In
Archibald, the court recognized that the airline must fill the plane in
a “reasonable and just manner” in an oversold situation.148 The
Delta’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 81, at 22.
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outwardly and discriminatory act of bumping may be legitimated by
proof that the airline adhered to its established policy and that policy
is reasonable.149 Here, the Complaint alleged that the Plaintiffs have
a right to equal treatment.150 Delta shipped Big Five trophies from
Africa up until August 3rd and even refused to bow to a prior petition
to stop shipping trophies.151 Further, Delta has stopped shipping
some trophies, even though is continues to ship other trophies.152
Delta's embargo is aimed at a particular person, place, and type of
traffic.153 The Plaintiffs also alleged that Delta has continued to carry
hunting trophies from animals outside of the Big Five.154
On its face, Delta's embargo treats all shippers alike. As discussed
earlier, this would not be violating any common carrier duty. Any
would-be shipper that wants to ship a Big Five hunting trophy will
not be allowed to do so throughout Delta's fleet. However, it does
make things slightly more interesting that the only people that would
want to ship these trophies in the first place are already a niche group
of people.155 Big-game hunters operate in a separate world from
weekend deer hunters in the United States.156 The $50,000 fee per
lion keeps the pastime out of economic reach for most game
hunters.157 While the ban may apply to any shipper, it is certainly
targeted at a select group. Whether this constitutes “unreasonable
discrimination” of the kind meant for protection under the statute
will be a question for the court to decide.
c. How Are Airlines Allowed to Reject Cargo?
There is an express provision in the FAA that allows airlines to
refuse cargo. Section 44902(b) states, “subject to regulations of the
Under Secretary, an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air
carrier may refuse to transport a passenger or property the carrier
decides is, or might be, inimical to safety.”158 The leading case on
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this issue is Air Line Pilots Assn., Intern. v. Civil Aeronautics
Board.159 In this case, the Air Lines Pilots Association challenged the
Civil Aeronautics Board’s (“CAB”) determination to reject the
airline embargoes of hazardous goods.160 The court stated, “if there is
carrier objection to the present regulations, the appropriate remedy is
carrier participation in a rule-making procedure.”161 In one of its
orders, the CAB noted that it would abrogate its statutory
responsibilities to the shipping and consuming public if it sanctioned
“pervasive refusals to carry shipments required by the public.”162 The
preceding statute to §44902(b) was 49 U.S.C. Appx. § 1511(a) and it
contained the same language as the present rule.163 The court in Air
Line Pilots Assn. found that if § 1511(a) provided such a broad
discretion then there would be no need to seek an embargo in the
first place.164 The court further found that the embargoes proposed
could not be characterized as constituting ad hoc determinations by
carriers.165 Lastly, the court held,
[t]here are rules which apply to the carriage of
hazardous materials, and it is implicit in these rules that
such goods, marked, labeled, packaged and stowed in
accordance with such rules, are not inimical to flight
safety in the judgment of the agencies charged by the
Congress with the responsibility of making these
determinations.166
In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, the D.C.
appellate court held that to the extent that airline carriers have the
right to choose what they will and will not carry, and for whom,
depends not only on common law duties of a common carrier but
also on the obligations imposed by the FAA.167 The court held that
former 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1511(a) does not embrace blanket
boycott of certain types of hazardous cargo via either embargo or
tariff route, but only authorizes ad hoc refusals to carry, such as
159
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where there has been determination that some particular freight for
some specific reason presents peril to safe flight.168 In other words,
airlines cannot refuse to transport various items designated as
dangerous articles by the Federal Aviation Administration, based on
the statute that gave air carriers permission to refuse to transport
property it deems inimical to safety.169
d. Does the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 Preempt Plaintiffs'
Claim for Tortious Interference With Business Relations?
In count two of the Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that they have
been harmed by Delta in their business relationships.170 The
Plaintiffs essentially claimed that the various organizations have lost
out revenue that they otherwise would have made, had Delta’s
embargo not been in place.171 Regardless of the merit of this claim,
an examination of the legality in bringing such a claim must be given
a closer look. The relevant statute at issue reads,
“[e]xcept as provided in this subsection, a State, political
subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2
States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision having the force and effect of law related
to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may
provide air transportation under this subpart.”172
In 1978, Congress amended the FAA after determining that
efficiency, innovation, low prices, variety, and quality would be
promoted by reliance on competitive market forces rather than
pervasive federal regulation.173 Congress enacted the ADA to
dismantle federal economic regulation.174 To ensure that the States
would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own, the
ADA included a pre-emption provision.175 The Court in Morales
stated, “pre-emption may be either express or implied, and is
168
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compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose.”176 The Court went on to hold that State enforcement
actions having a connection with, or reference to, airline rates,
routes, or services are pre-empted under the statute.177
The Court in Hodges v. Delta Airlines offered the most widely
used definition for what “services” means under the statute.178
“Services” generally represent a bargained-for or anticipated
provision of labor from one party to another.179 Elements of the air
carrier service bargain include items such as ticketing, boarding
procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in
addition to the transportation itself.180 The Court then went on to
hold that while state actions related to airline services were
preempted under the statute, it did not displace state tort actions for
personal physical injuries or property damage caused by the
operation and maintenance of aircraft.181 In American Airlines v.
Wolens, the Court held that state-law-based court adjudication of
routine breach-of-contract claims were permitted under the ADA.182
e. The Definition of “Services”
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit further expounded on
the definition of “services,” specifically in how they relate to airline
shipping in Tobin v. Federal Express Corporation.183 In that case,
the Court found that all of the plaintiffs’ common-law claims
depended on FedEx's “package handling, address verification, and
delivery procedures.”184 The Court found all of these items to
“plainly concern the contractual arrangement between FedEx and
users of its services (those who send packages)” and stated that the
plaintiff's claims implicated FedEx's services.185 While tortiuously
undertaken conduct may not itself be a service that would be
bargained for or anticipated by a consumer, the relevant inquiry is
176
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whether enforcement of the plaintiff's claims would impose some
obligation on an airline-defendant with respect to conduct that, when
properly undertaken, is a service.186 The most instructive excerpt
came at the end of Tobin opinion when the Court stated, “[s]o it is
here: where the duty of care alleged drills into the core of an air
carrier's services and liability for a breach of that duty could affect
fundamental changes in the carrier's current or future offerings, the
plaintiff's claims are preempted by the ADA.”187 Thus, it is clear that
in the context of a shipping company, the service of shipping would
qualify under the statute.
f. Is the Shipment of Hunting Trophies Considered a Service?
Through case law, it becomes clear that the Plaintiffs’ state-law
claim for tortious interference with business relations is preempted
under the ADA. The first determination that must be made is
whether Delta's refusal to ship big game hunting trophies would
constitute a service. According to the definition given in Hodges,
most courts should have no problem finding that the answer is yes.
The “service” being offered or lack thereof is the service of shipping.
Delta as an airline offers shipping as a service. Just as Tobin found
that shipping constituted a service, any court with this matter before
it would also find that shipping is a “service,” offered by Delta
Airlines, which would satisfy the definition under the statute.
The next determination that must be made is whether this clam has
a “connection to” an airline's “rates, routes, or services.” The answer
to this seems to be clearly, yes. The claim arises out of Delta's
refusal to transport hunting trophies. If the Plaintiffs were to win this
suit in court, then Delta would be forced to expand a service that it
does not already offer. This is precisely the type of regulation that
the statute was designed to prevent. The clear legislative intent
behind the creation of the statute was the belief that airlines would be
most efficient if they regulated themselves. Furthermore, case law
has shown that this would be outside of Congress’ intent when it
created the preemption provision.
However, in the Conservation Force’s Response to Delta’s
Answer, the Plaintiffs’ alleged that the tortious interference claim
does not challenge Delta's services, but rather “the deceptive and
defamatory effect of Delta's embargo and its negative impact on
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Plaintiffs' business relations.”188 Plaintiffs’ claimed that they are
challenging the implication that Big Five Hunters act unlawfully and
that this public broadcast by Delta's embargo damaged the Plaintiffs'
business relationships.189 Further, Plaintiffs alleged that both Delta's
acts and statements bundled lawful Big Five trophies with unlawful
contraband.190
The Fifth Circuit spoke directly to this issue and held that tortious
interference with business relationships is expressly preempted under
the ADA.191 In that case, a travel agency had an agreement with
American Airlines in which it was authorized to sell tickets on the
airline.192 Under a new agreement, the travel agency's commissions
were cut significantly.193 The travel agency sued American Airlines
and claimed that the airlines knew that it was going to reduce
commissions and should have disclosed the impending changes.194
The court found that the claim involved the airline's dealings with
customers and that it sought the application of Texas common law in
a way that would regulate the airline’s pricing policies, commission
structure and reservation practices.195 The court noted that Wolens
expressed the ADA's purpose, which was to leave airlines free to
choose the selection and design of market mechanisms appropriate to
the furnishing of their transportation services.196 The court held that
“the carrier's relations with travel agents, as intermediaries between
carriers and passengers, plainly fall within the ADA's deregulatory
concerns” and ultimately preempted the plaintiff’s claim.197
While all of the allegations may very well be true, the case law is
clear that any claim relating to an airline's “services” will be preempted. A judge will most likely find in favor of Delta on this claim
because the ADA preemption provision is “deliberately
expansive.”198 Therefore, it is clear that the claim for tortious
interference of business relations cannot stand because Congress,
under the ADA, expressly preempts it.
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g. What Are the Public Policy Implications of a Decision?
One of the central focuses of the Complaint is the benefit that Big
Game Hunting provides in Africa, and the public policy implications.
The Complaint alleged that the benefits include habitat preservation,
wildlife management, and anti-poaching.199 It also stated that hunting
fees make up the lion's share of operating budget revenue for
national and local wildlife authorities, which dedicate the largest
share of their budgets to rangers and equipment.200 Additionally, the
Complaint alleges that tourist safari hunting generates funds for
remote villages where photo tourists do not travel and where the
local people are most affected by crop-raiding elephants and
livestock eating lions.201
It has been estimated that trophy hunting generates revenues of US
$200 million annually on the African continent.202 The lion
population in Africa is estimated to be in the range of 35,000 animals
with about 665 killed as trophies for export every year.203 A report
prepared by Economist at Large revealed that very little money goes
to community development.204 The report finds that as little as three
percent of a Tanzanian hunting company's income goes to the local
communities that support the bulk of the conservation work.205
Instead, most of the money goes to companies, government agencies,
and individuals located internationally or in national capitals.206 Even
if the Plaintiffs were able to show that the hunting does actually help
conservation efforts, there are still several hurdles that the Plaintiffs
will have to overcome for public policy to become a relevant
consideration in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
It appears that the legal hurdles that the Plaintiffs will have to
overcome will be too great. The ADA was designed to provide
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airlines the freedom to make these types of decisions. It will be
interesting to see how the Texas district court chooses to handle the
undue discrimination claim, but, because the ban treats all shippers
alike, the court will most likely find that Delta was within its rights.

